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and that all sorts and conditions of life are equally good. I conclude, therefore, and I suspect that in most moods Nietzsche would have conceded, that the nature and qualities of Beyond-man have not been determined. He is still the ghost that marches before us, more beautiful than we are, but only dimly seen. He does not stand out clear-cut against the sky as an artist in ethics would wish. Still, for Zarathustra, the man of practice, he suffices; for he points him the way to his work.

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EVOLUTION AND THE SELF-REALIZATION THEORY.

The doctrine that self-realization is the supreme end in the moral life has many advantages over rival theories in ethics. As the chief of its merits, this view of morality affirms the dependence of the Good upon the nature of man. Authority is attributed to the Ideal because it represents the whole nature of the human individual, and indicates the conditions to be fulfilled if he is to realize all his capabilities. Thus the self-realization theory relieves morality of that arbitrary and external character which it has when the authority of the Ideal is derived from an extrinsic source. Intuitionism proved untenable because it maintained that the different moral laws possessed absolute and arbitrary authority. We believe that to hold such a view and to consider duty as an injunction laid on man from without, regardless of his needs and inclinations, is to declare morality essentially irrational and the ethical problem by nature insoluble.

But if "self-realization" is especially reasonable because it shows how the *summum bonum* is grounded in human nature, the great danger which lurks in the theory is a consequence of this very insight. Emphasizing the relative character of morality, it is apt to neglect the authority which attaches to its behests, and to interpret the moral life as an intelligent

pursuit of self-interest. In fact the chief defect of the theory is this tendency to become a merely prudential or even egoistic scheme of life. The existence of such a tendency is easy to explain. The Good is interpreted as the realization of all the capabilities of human nature. As that which satisfies all his needs, the moral ideal expresses the whole interest of the individual. It corresponds, therefore, to the demands of an enlightened prudence. Prudence and goodness are thus identical. As their identity becomes more plain, it tends to appear more direct and immediate. Hence to the individual the pursuit of virtue becomes equivalent to that ordering of conduct and regulating of impulse which prudence requires. Goodness is reduced to a calculation based on self-interest. Attention to his own interest makes the individual self-centered and oblivious of the good of others. This movement naturally culminates in a frank egoism which finds the good of each individual in the gratification of his own desires.

The older, self-realization theories tried to avoid this danger by the hypothesis of two "selves" in each individual. Every human being was supposed to possess, on the one hand, a higher rational self whose good was universal and identical with the good of all other intelligent beings. It is this higher self whose possibilities are realized in the moral life. But, on the other hand, man has a lower natural self whose narrow interest and selfish desires are often opposed to the Good. Hence the lower self must be frequently coerced and constantly disciplined in the course of moral development. Moralists who made use of this conception of two selves naturally connected the higher self with the specifically human attributes of intelligence, freedom, etc., while the lower self was supposed to express the self-assertive tendency of our animal nature. The ethics of T. H. Green furnishes a classic example of a self-realization theory based on the hypothesis of two selves. The Good according to Green consists in the realization of all the capabilities of man as a self-conscious subject, and thus a partial reproduction of the Absolute Consciousness. The individual can realize himself only in the society of his fellows; but the possibility of such a society

depends on the self-conscious personality of the individual; since it is only by virtue of this part of his nature that he is able to treat other individuals as ends in themselves and thus make their good his own. His natural or appetitive self, to the contrary, tends to treat all things, including other individuals, as means to the gratification of selfish desire.

The conception of two selves has real value, and no doubt expresses a profound truth. But it has serious difficulties. The unity of personal character seems to be violated by the supposition that it includes two selves. Such a conception falls under the condemnation inflicted at present on all theories which divide the self up into faculties or principles. The organic unity of the individual consciousness seems to forbid the existence within it of two distinct principles or selves. Again the hypothesis in question may lead to a violation of the continuity in development which is so strongly emphasized in these days. If we understand the higher self as an exclusively human possession not shared by the lower animals, we must suppose that it originated at a certain time in the process of organic evolution, and was exactly coincident with the appearance of man. Green allows himself to speak as if the Eternal Consciousness supervened at a certain time upon an animal organism, vesting it with the character of self-conscious personality.

These difficulties have led to a general abandonment of the conception of two selves in recent self-realization theories. Instead, the inclination of the present is to give a naturalistic interpretation to the theory. The *summum bonum* is described as the harmonious realization of all the natural capacities of man. Each natural impulse—so it is affirmed—should receive a measure of gratification proportionate to the claims of all the rest. Since the social impulses are natural like the others, the individual who realizes them all in due proportion will perform his full duty toward his fellow-men. Mr. Alexander's "Moral Order and Progress" furnishes an excellent example of a self-realization theory of this type. Goodness, he tells us, may be understood either as (1) an adjustment of activities in the individual, or as (2) an ad-

justment of the individual in society. These forms of adjustment are identical in process and in result. Hence the individual who gives harmonious expression to all his impulses, at the same time discharges in full his obligation to society.

Now when the self-realization theory discards the idea of a higher self and finds the Good in the realization of all the natural impulses of man, it shows the tendency—which we noticed was inherent in it—to approach a merely prudential scheme of life. If moral endeavor is entirely absorbed in an expression of our natural impulses, it is too obviously a matter of simple prudence. If the effort of each individual is concentrated on producing such a harmonious adjustment of his desires that each shall receive the maximum of satisfaction, self-interest becomes the guiding principle in morality. Thus our theory seems to approach dangerously near to egoism. Moreover, self-realization so interpreted does not explain the authority which attaches to the Ideal and the coercion which it exercises over the individual. Duty rules over him as an authority external to himself, and often opposed to his interest as he views it. Self-sacrifice also receives no adequate explanation from this rendering of the self-realization theory. Self-sacrifice is not a matter of compromise between different impulses in the individual. It is a case of opposition of interest between individuals, in which one deliberately surrenders what he believes to be his good in order to promote the welfare of another. When an ethical theory can give no satisfactory account of such features as these, essential to everyday morality, it certainly stands in need of some additions. If the hypothesis of two selves is untenable some other idea or principle should be supplied to account for the facts left unexplained.

May not the idea of evolution incorporated in the self-realization theory furnish just the aid needed to prevent its degenerating into a mere prudential calculus? Under its influence we recognize that the moral agent or self passes through several distinct stages in his development. From the evolutionary standpoint we can distinguish clearly between

the actually existent self of any stage and the more complete self merely implicit at this stage, and to actually exist at a later period in the development. Hence we can see how the Good may realize all the capacities of the self when these are fully developed at a late stage, and yet be external and opposed to the interest of the same self at an earlier period when many of its capacities remain latent. Thus a good which includes the welfare of others may completely realize all the impulses of the individual when his character is fully evolved and his latent tendencies to benevolence and coöperation have become actual. But this same good may be partially opposed to his interests at a previous stage when his altruistic tendencies are undeveloped, and consequently the good of others is external to his self-interest.

Let us follow out this interpretation of the process of self-realization as an evolution of character or personality, and see if it does not throw light upon some points which "self-realization" alone does not explain. Such an evolution involves an organization of the primitive material of character into a completely articulated system.¹ Man's original impulses, which are at first chaotic and discordant, must be adjusted into a coherent and harmonious whole. In this process two distinct steps are necessary: First, the organization of single impulses in the individual and, second, the adjustment of the definite individuality thus created into the larger social system.² During the entire course of this development the character of

¹ This interpretation of moral development as an evolution of character or personality is explained somewhat more fully in an article by the writer, "Evolution and Ethical Method," *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, p. 59.

² The facts of moral evolution conflict with Mr. Alexander's view that these two forms of adjustment are identical in process and result. The second step mentioned, the adjustment of the individual in society, depends upon and is conditioned by the first, the formation of a coherent individuality through the organization of different impulses. Hence these two processes cannot be merged into one, and the account of moral evolution given in this article hinges entirely upon a recognition of their distinctness and the consequent impossibility of interpreting the moral life as a simple matter of adjustment and compromise between the various desires of the individual.

the individual is changing. His different impulses are becoming more clearly manifest and more precisely defined. His latent capacities are being progressively realized. His many single desires are combined into a less number of more inclusive purposes. The attainment of these purposes represents to the individual his good. What the individual thus believes to be his good at any stage in the evolution may be termed his *interest* to distinguish it from the complete good which he only recognizes at the end of the process when all his possibilities are unfolded. The interest of the individual, of course, changes as his character evolves. It constantly enlarges in the sense that it becomes more complete and comprehensive. It expresses more and more of the intrinsic capacities of the self. As self-interest becomes in this way broader, it will embrace ends and objects not heretofore included in it. Thus at higher stages it will include elements which at lower stages have been outside and even opposed to the good of the individual *as he understood it then*.

The Good, as the ideal of goodness, is identical with the interest of the individual person when his character is completely evolved. When all his capacities are developed the good which he recognizes as his own, is the complete realization of himself. The satisfaction of the desires he feels is then equivalent to true self-satisfaction. We are sufficiently acquainted with the trend of moral evolution to understand in a general way the nature of the good of the fully developed self. Man finds his true good in the furtherance of social welfare. He realizes himself by discharging with perfect efficiency his functional office in society. His mind, when fully enlightened, perceives that all men have a common interest in virtue of the intelligent personality which they all possess. His will, when thoroughly trained, prefers to promote those larger ends which have a permanent significance for the entire human race. His sympathy when sufficiently broadened extends to all mankind and makes him feel their joys and sorrows as his own. But this larger good, which satisfies the desires of the whole self, is the actual interest of the individual only at the end of a long struggle upward.

Only then, when this process is consummated, does the voice of self-interest harmonize with the call of duty. Only then is the moral vision sufficiently illumined to reveal things in their true proportions, not distorted by the warping effects of self-interest.

But before the good of moral evolution is reached a large discrepancy is sure to exist between the true good of the individual and his actual interest. Self-interest—as the conscious expression of individuality—is the result of the organization of many impulses into a unitary system. It stands for the individual in his individuality as a single unit among many. When it first emerges from the confusion of opposing impulses, its exclusive character is strongly marked. The individual is sharply conscious of himself as possessing plans and purposes—in short, an interest—which is entirely his own and quite different from the interest of every other human being. Hence one prominent part of the true good is external to self-interest at this stage. The welfare of others, which constitutes so important an element in the good when completely realized, is largely absent from the interest of the self when this is first defined in moral evolution. The cost of increasing coherence is at first increasing narrowness of character. The immediate result of concentration may be accentuated selfishness. When a man by the ordering of his various impulses awakens to the existence of his own individuality his attention is naturally centered on himself, and upon his hopes and plans as a separate individual. He finds that his ambition often conflicts with the purposes of others. The whole tendency of his awakened self-consciousness is to fulfill this ambition of his, to satisfy his own desire at any cost, regardless of the welfare of others and the suffering he may cause among his fellow-men. If, notwithstanding his natural inclinations, he feels obliged to promote another's interest at the expense of his own, he regards the good which he realizes as entirely external to himself. Duty appears to him as foreign authority coercing him against his will and compelling him to give up his own good. Such is the "natural" self whose narrow interest and aggressive

selfishness have frequently and with justice been contrasted with the broader altruistic tendencies of the "spiritual" or more highly developed self.

Thus in all stages of incomplete development the actual interest of the moral agent is only partially identical with his true good. But those elements of the good not consciously included by the individual in his interest are, to be sure, represented in his nature. They appear in that Ideal of Goodness whose authority over the individual testifies to the presence in him of capacities undeveloped, of a larger self as yet unrealized. The obligation he feels to pursue another's welfare at the expense of his own interest is itself a tacit admission that his good includes the welfare of his fellows. But there is a notable difference between preferring another's well-being as a hard duty enforced by conscience and promoting it as a matter of course because a recognized part of self-realization. Hence, while we assume with the self-realizationist that the Good is the true interest of the self, still we must not fail to recognize that the conditions of moral evolution are such that until the very end of the process—which, it must be confessed, is more an ideal goal than an existent state—the actual interest and the true good of the individual are always different and often opposed. Although we must affirm the ultimate identity of goodness and self-interest, yet to identify them in an immediate and offhand manner is to misinterpret moral development by neglecting this feature which we have been considering. Goodness and self-interest are necessarily different and in frequent conflict during the whole of the evolution of character and their identification is achieved only in a final synthesis which transcends every opposition and contains all differences completely reconciled.

Nor can the conflict in question be removed by teaching the individual that goodness and self-interest are ultimately identical. It does not suffice to inform him that the Ideal represents his real interest. He must be trained in the hard school of moral experience. Not a change in his ideas but a change in his character is necessary if he is to fully appre-

ciate the extent of his true interest. His nature must be transformed. The latent capacities of his larger self must be evoked. Then new desires and tendencies will manifest themselves which find satisfaction only in the furtherance of the broadest human well-being. This development of character is accomplished by rigorous obedience to duty and continual self-sacrifice. In this way the hampering confines of a narrow self-interest, incident to an immature character, are broken down, and the individual finds that what he took for a foreign exaction is in reality a part of his own good and a condition of his own self-realization.

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THE ETHICS OF STATE INTERFERENCE IN THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS.

State interference in the domestic relations is expressed in laws and penalties concerning marriage, divorce, and remarriage. If two persons wish to marry, they may find that their marriage would be pronounced void by the State. If two married persons wish to become divorced, they may find that the law refuses to permit the separation. If two divorced persons wish to marry again, they may find a long delay necessary, or the way to remarriage closed. Most of the States of the Union require at least one year's residence in the State before divorce may be granted; many States require two years' residence; one State (Connecticut) requires three years' residence in some cases; and there are further requirements concerning causes, and the filing and publishing notice of suit, before divorce may be granted. The State of South Carolina allows no absolute divorce. Concerning remarriage after divorce, many States have restrictions and prohibitions. In Vermont, the defendant may not remarry within three years, unless with the plaintiff; in Maryland, the court may decree that the defendant shall not remarry during the lifetime of